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Abstract:  This paper empirically analyzes the effect of exchange rate regimes and capital account 
liberalization policies on the occurrence of currency crises for 21 countries over the period of1970-1998. We 
examine changes of the likelihood of currency crises under de jure, and de facto exchange rate regimes. We 
also test whether the impact of the exchange rate regimes on currency stability would be different under free 
and restricted capital flows. Our findings show that the likelihood of currency crises changes significantly 
under de facto regimes. However, the results are sensitive to the choice of de facto exchange rate 
arrangements. Furthermore, in our sample, capital control policies appear to be helpful in preventing low 
duration currency crises. The results are robust to a wide variety of sample and models checks.  
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1. Introduction 
The links between the incidence of currency crises and the choice of exchange rate regimes as well as the 
impact of capital market liberalization policies on the occurrence of currency crises have been subject of 
considerable debates in recent years. It is of great interest to assess how exchange rate arrangements and 
financial liberalization will affect episodes of crisis. Policy makers also seek to know what type of 
exchange rate regime is more sustainable and whether controlling capital flows in fact contributes to the 
stability of currencies. 
Yet, the literature is not clear on these issues and presents mixed views. Many economists argue that fixed 
exchange rates are a cause of currency crises while others find that the intermediate and/or flexible 
exchange regimes are more crisis prone. The role of capital market liberalization is even more 
controversial. The common view in the literature blames high capital mobility as an underlying cause of 
currency crises, especially when combined with fixed exchange rates. However, several studies hold that 
capital mobility restrictions are responsible for crises – as a contributing factor behind the crises – and 
advocate financial liberalization. It is evident that, for the time being, there is no consensus on these 
topics and more research is required before the controversies can be settled. 
The main purpose of this paper is to systematically examine what type of exchange rate regimes are more 
susceptible to currency crises by investigating the data from twenty OECD countries and South Africa 
over the period of 1970-1998. We adapt the empirical models of the determinants of currency crises, 
which were presented in Karimi and Voia (2011b), as the benchmark models and examine how the 
likelihood of currency crises is influenced by de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes. We also study 
the role of capital mobility and test for currency stability under free and restricted capital flows. Finally, 
we examine whether the hazard of speculative attack changes under the different combinations of 
exchange rate regimes and the presence or absence of capital controls. 
We employ two prominent de facto exchange rate regime classifications in the literature, those of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), to identify the actual exchange 
rate arrangements. Our index for de jure exchange rate regimes is the IMF exchange rate classification. 
We also categorize capital mobility policies into restricted and open policies with the help of Chinn and 
Ito’s (2005) index of financial openness.   
As in Karimi and Voia (2011b), duration analysis is our methodology to study the probability of a 
currency crisis occurrence under different exchange rate regimes and capital mobility policies. Duration 
models rigorously incorporate the time factor into the likelihood functions and allow us to investigate 
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how the amount of time that a currency has already spent in the tranquil state affects the stability of the 
currency. This feature helps us to capture the unobservable determinants of currency stability that are 
embodied in the baseline hazard functions. We apply semi-parametric duration models to estimate the 
unrestricted baseline hazard of a currency exiting a tranquil state into a turbulence state. These models do 
not require any distribution assumptions about the timing of failures and can capably deal with both 
monotonic and non-monotonic duration dependence. Compared to other duration models, they are more 
realistic and can produce estimations that are more efficient. 
The nonlinear nature of duration specification lets us investigate how the different exchange rate regimes 
or the presence and absence of capital controls can change the sensitivity of currency crises with respect 
to changes in a set of macroeconomic fundamentals and contagion channels. Furthermore, we use crisis 
episodes that are identified by extreme value theory to minimize the concerns regarding the accuracy of 
crisis episodes dating. We apply several robustness checks, including running our models on two different 
crisis episodes sets that are based on monthly and quarterly-type spells, to verify the reliability of our 
estimation results. 
We find that there is a significant link between the choice of exchange rate regime and the incidence of 
currency crises in our sample. Nevertheless, the results are sensitive to the choice of the de facto 
exchange rate system. When we use Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) de facto classification to categorize the 
exchange rate regimes, fixed exchange rate arrangements are least susceptible to speculative attacks. 
However, when we rely on Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s (2005) de facto classification, intermediate 
exchange rate regimes will experience the smallest number of currency crisis incidences. On the other 
hand, we find that the impact of capital account policies on the occurrence of currency crises, in our 
sample, demonstrates different results. While the baseline hazard of open-type capital accounts is lower 
than the baseline hazard of restricted-type capital accounts, when we enter our set of control variables to 
the models, the hazard of open-type capital accounts appears to be higher than the hazard of restricted-
type capital accounts. This relation is more significant at the low duration crisis episodes. 
For the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows. Section 2 looks at the exchange rate regimes 
classifications and briefly introduces the two de facto exchange rate regime classifications that we use in 
this paper. It also quickly reviews the empirical literature on the links between exchange rate regimes and 
the occurrence of currency crises. Section 3 reviews the empirical literature and presents the links 
between capital control policies and occurrences of currency crises. Section 4 describes the empirical 
methodology and data. Section 5 presents the main empirical results and robustness tests. Section 6 
discusses the results and concludes. Some detailed technical results are presented in the appendix. 
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2. Classification of exchange rate regimes and currency crises 
2.1. Classifications 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, a large empirical literature has developed to assess the 
performance of exchange rate regimes. The early literature – e.g. the influential work of Baxter and 
Stockman (1989) – compared the performance of key macroeconomic variables with fixed and flexible 
exchange rate arrangements. However, they found little significant differences across fixed and flexible 
regimes.  There was a drawback in the way that they characterized the exchange rate regimes and this 
shortcoming affected negatively the early literature.  
For many years, empirical studies relied on the International Monetary Fund’s de jure classification of 
exchange rate regimes to measure the impact of exchange rate arrangements on economic performance.
1
 
This classification is a countries’ self-declared index, which was published in the Fund’s Annual Report 
on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
2 However, in a pioneering paper, Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002) noticed that in practice there is a substantial deviation between the officially reported and 
the actually prevailing exchange rate arrangements.
3
 Therefore, the empirical results of those analyses 
based on the de jure classification could be misleading. This problem motivated researchers to devise 
alternative classifications to identify the de facto exchange rate regimes and categorize countries more 
accurately according to their actual practice rather than official statement.
4
 
In this subsection, we briefly introduce two prominent alternative classifications in the literature: Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005).
5
 Reinhart and Rogoff (hereafter RR) rely 
on the IMF classification as their starting point and develop their own classification system based on a 
statistical analysis of the ex post behavior of exchange rates in the official, dual and/or parallel markets. 
For countries with only official rates they apply a broad variety of descriptive statistics (mostly exchange 
rate variability, variability with respect to the officially announced bands, and inflation) to verify whether 
the de jure classification is accurate. If not, they reclassify the exchange rate into the alternative 
                                                          
1. Ideally, the exchange-rate system classification ought to be based on the degree to which a system in a particular 
category constrains domestic monetary policy independence (Tavlas et al.; 2008). 
2. The de jure classification roughly distinguished between three broad categories: pegged, limited flexibility, and more 
flexible. These three coarse categories could be extended into fifteen fine subcategories that cover a continuum of 
exchange rates regimes from hard fixes to free floats. 
3. For example, several economies officially reported their currencies as pegs but often underwent frequent devaluations 
and, hence, in practice their regimes resembled a flexible more than a fixed. Alternatively, other countries officially 
committed to the flexible exchange rates, however, exhibited “fear of floating” and acted differently. 
4. To address this and a few other shortcomings, the IMF has adopted a modified classification system based on the 
Fund’s members’ de facto regimes since 1999. Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) provide more details. 
5. Tavlas et al. (2008) review the main methodologies that have been used to construct the de facto exchange rate regimes. 
They also survey the empirical literature that has been generated by the de facto classifications. 
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categories. For countries with dual and/or parallel rates, they classify the exchange rate based on the 
market-determined rates, which they argue are important indicators of the underlying monetary policy.  
RR classify the exchange rates regimes into fourteen fine categories. Nevertheless, these categories can be 
aggregated into three coarse branches: fixed, intermediate, and float. The fixed branch includes: (1) 
regimes with no separate legal tender, (2) regimes with a pre-announced peg or currency board 
arrangements, (3) regimes with a pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to 
plus/minus two percent, and, (4) regimes with a de facto peg. The intermediate branch contains: (5) pre-
announced crawling pegs, (6) regimes with a pre-announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal 
to plus/minus two percent, (7) de facto crawling pegs, (8) regimes with a pre-announced crawling band 
that is wider than or equal to plus/minus two percent, (9) regimes with a de facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to plus/minus two percent, (10) regimes with a de facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to plus/minus five percent, (11) regimes with a moving band that is narrower than 
or equal to plus/minus two percent, and, (12) managed floating arrangements. Finally, the float branch 
includes: (13) freely floating exchange rates. The last category, (14) free falling regimes, can be 
reclassified into fixed, intermediate, or float on the basis of the provided chronologies.
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Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (hereafter LYS) use cluster analysis and construct their alternative 
classification exclusively based on the official exchange rate and the evolution of foreign exchange 
reserves. They adopt the classic textbook definition of fixed and flexible exchange rates to classify the 
regimes. They categorize the exchange rate arrangements that are associated with low volatility in (1) 
nominal exchange rate level ( ) and, (2) changes in nominal exchange rate ( ) but high volatility in 
international reserves ( ) as fixed exchange rate regimes, while arrangements with high volatility 
exchange rate levels and exchange rate movements but stable international reserves are defined as flexible 
exchange rate regimes.  
LYS fine classification distinguishes five different regimes: (1) fixed regimes, 2) crawling pegs, (3) dirty 
floats, (4) floats, and, (5) inconclusive.
7
 However, their coarse classification collapses into three 
categories: (1) fixed, (2) intermediate, and, (3) float. LYS purely rely on statistical methodology, hence, 
almost one third of the observations in their sample cannot be classified by their algorithm due to missing 
data or because the exchange rate was pegged to an undisclosed basket. 
                                                          
6. RR classify an exchange rate arrangement as a free falling regime if the 12-month inflation rate is equal to or exceeds 
40 percent per annum. The regime is also considered to be free falling during the six months immediately following a 
currency crisis and there is a transition from a peg or a quasi-peg regime to a managed or independent float regime. See 
the Appendix in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) for more details. 
7. Inconclusive regimes include those exchange rates that experience low volatility with respect to all three characteristics 
or for which there is no information about the classifying variables. Nearly two percent of the regimes were classified as 
inconclusive in the latest update of LYS. 
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RR and LYS’s de facto exchange rate regimes are very popular among alternative classifications and the 
series that they provide have been widely used in the empirical literature. The latest update of RR dataset 
provides monthly de facto exchange rate regimes for 227 countries from January 1940 through December 
2007, while the latest update of LYS dataset provides annual de facto exchange rate regimes for 183 
countries from 1974 through 2004. 
Both RR and LYS classifications have made a significant contribution to the de facto exchange regimes 
literature. Nevertheless, there are two concerns regarding the alternative classification. First, there is no 
empirical evidence on how to choose among the existing alternative systems. Second, there is no 
commonly accepted test – indeed few studies have been performed – to verify the reliability of these 
classifications and accordingly the studies that use them. In a recent paper, Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia 
(2011) investigate the disagreement between de facto exchange rate regimes.
8
 They find that there is a 
good amount of agreement across the classifications; however, the disagreements are not negligible. Their 
results show that the disagreement is more pronounced in the case of emerging and developing countries. 
2.2. Exchange rate regimes and currency crises 
The wave of currency crisis incidences in the 1990’s and early 2000’s has stimulated the debates on the 
potential links between the choice of an exchange rate regime and the occurrence of crises. Fischer (2001) 
and Williamson (2002), among others, view fixed exchange rate regimes as crisis prone and argue that, in 
a world of integrated financial markets, rigid exchange rates are more susceptible to speculative attacks.  
Yet, during the major currency crisis events, intermediate exchange rate regimes (soft pegs and tightly 
managed floats) have been the main targets of speculative attacks. Therefore, some researchers suggest 
that such regimes are not viable and support for the “bipolar view” of exchange rate regimes. The 
proponents of the bipolar view claim that the intermediate regimes suffer from a lack of verification and 
transparency. Moreover, they argue that high capital mobility leaves little room for the governments to 
follow inconsistent internal and external policies. Thus, in a world of free international capital mobility, 
countries will be forced to abandon the intermediate regimes and choose between the two extreme 
exchange rate regimes: either hard pegs or freely floating regimes (see e.g., Eichengreen, 1994; and 
Fischer, 2001).  
Nevertheless, many economists have challenged the bipolar view. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
demonstrated empirically that many intermediate regimes have not vanished and have maintained their 
                                                          
8. They use data from three popular classification schemes: RR, LYS, and Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002), which has been 
extended by Anderson (2009).  
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existence. They pointed out that the bipolar systems do not necessarily enhance the credibility of 
monetary-exchange rate policies and can even destabilize the financial system. Williamson (2000 and 
2002) advocates intermediate regimes and proposes certain types of them (i.e. band, basket, and crawl) as 
the arrangements that can stabilize the real effective exchange rate and improve the sustainability of the 
exchange system. He argues these regimes can help preventing misalignments and provide greater 
flexibility to cope with shocks, whereas hard pegs and free floats can cause misalignments and damage 
the sustainability of the system.  
Some researchers have empirically studied the links between the exchange rate regimes and the 
occurrence of currency crises. Ghosh et al. (2003) statistically examine the impact of exchange rate 
regimes on currency crises for the IMF country members from 1972 to 1999. Using the IMF’s du jure 
exchange rate regimes and their own constructed de facto classification, they find that crises are more 
likely under floating regimes.  
Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2003) investigate the links between the exchange rate regime and the incidence 
of currency crises among IMF country members from 1990 to 2001. Their logit model estimation results, 
obtained on the basis of the de facto exchange rate regimes of Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002), provide 
some support for the bipolar view. During their sample period, the likelihood of crises for the 
intermediate regimes was significantly higher than that of hard pegs and floating regimes. 
Rogoff et al. (2004) and Husain et al. (2005), using the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), estimate the probability of currency crises for IMF country members. According to their results, 
over the 1970 to 2000 period, currency crises tended to occur more frequently in the intermediate 
regimes. Applying an alternative measure of currency crises, they find floating regimes have a 
significantly lower risk of entering into a crisis compared to pegs and intermediate regimes. 
 Haile and Pozo (2006) apply probit models to test whether the exchange regime in place has an impact 
on the vulnerability of countries to currency crises. Their sample includes 18 developed countries from 
1974 to 1998. When they use Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s (2005) de facto exchange rate regimes, 
their results show that the de facto exchange arrangements play no role in determining crisis periods. 
However, when they use the IMF de jure classification, they find that the probability of currency crises is 
higher for the declared pegged regimes than for intermediate or floating regimes. 
 Esaka (2010a, b) examines how de facto exchange rate regimes affect the occurrence of currency crises 
in 84 countries from 1980 to 2001. His probit model estimation results, obtained by employing the de 
facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), demonstrate no significant increase in the likelihood of 
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currency crises for the intermediate regimes compared with the hard pegs and free floating regimes 
(Esaka, 2010a). He finds pegged regimes significantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises 
compared with floating regimes (Esaka, 2010b). He also found that hard pegs with liberalized capital 
account significantly decrease the probability of currency crises compared to the floating and intermediate 
regimes with capital control. 
3. Capital markets liberalization and currency stability 
The link between capital markets liberalization and macroeconomic instability is one of the key topics in 
international economics. Many economists and policymakers believe that large and volatile capital flows 
make the international financial system unstable and cause currency crises. In their view, the 
liberalization of international capital flows, especially when combined with fixed exchange rates, will 
lead to financial disruptions (see e.g., Radelet and Sachs, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002). 
On the other hand, capital mobility restrictions may also undermine the stability of financial system and 
contribute to the occurrence of crises. Imposing capital controls will induce investment irreversibility, 
result in a net capital outflow, and worsen financial instability (Dooley and Isard, 1980). Moreover, 
restricted capital accounts can create distortions, signify inconsistent policies, and exhibit the potential 
vulnerabilities of the financial system, which may induce capital flight and trigger currency crises 
(Bartolini and Drazen, 1997).  
In addition to the lack of consensus on the links between capital market liberalization and the occurrence 
of currency crises, the potential interdependence of capital account policies with the choice of exchange 
rate regime makes the issue at stake even more complicated. It is widely recognized that under high 
capital mobility, monetary policies cannot easily focus on both maintaining fixed exchange rates and 
accommodating with real shocks effectively. This is usually referred to as the “impossible trinity”.9 It 
points to the argument that policymakers in open economies may concentrate only on two of three 
conflicting objectives: capital mobility, monetary independence, and the stable fixed exchange rate.
10
 This 
argument implies there could be interdependence between the choices of exchange rate regimes and 
capital account policies. 
As a direct implication of the impossible trinity, one can expect, due to the current trend of financial 
liberalization, monetary policies will increasingly become inconsistent with the sustainability of fixed 
                                                          
9. However, Lavoie (2001) counters the impossible trinity claim and argues that even under capital mobility can maintain 
their monetary policy autonomy. Partially based on his argument, Frenkel and Rapetti (2007) analyze the macroeconomic 
evolution of Argentina during the (2001) crisis and question the validity of impossible trinity. 
10. Obstfeld and Taylor (2005) elaborate the role of impossible trinity on the evolution of the international financial 
system.   
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exchange rates and make this type of exchange rate arrangement more crises prone (this conclusion is 
incompatible with the bipolar view). Furthermore, wide financial and trade integration, rapid financial 
innovations, and deep financial developments have gradually reduced the effectiveness of capital controls 
and consequently the monetary policy-exchange rate stability dilemma is now evident even in the 
countries that are willing to impose capital controls. 
Several studies empirically investigate the impact of capital control policies on insulating countries from 
the macroeconomic instability and currency crises. Edwards (1989) investigates the role of capital 
controls in 39 devaluation episodes for 24 developing countries from 1961 to 1982. His findings show 
that these countries typically employed intensified capital controls programs in the year before the 
devaluation to slow down the unavoidable balance of payment crises. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997) estimate the probability of a systemic crisis for both industrial and developing countries over the 
period of 1980-1994. Their results indicate that capital account liberalization can contribute to the 
macroeconomic instability and the occurrence of banking crises.  
On the other hand, Glick and Hutchison (2005) study the link between capital controls and currency 
stability for 69 emerging and developing countries from 1975 to 1997. Their probit estimation results 
show that restrictions on capital flows are unable to efficiently protect countries from currency crises. 
Their findings provide no evidence that countries with high capital mobility are more prone to speculative 
attacks. Glick, Guo, and Hutchison (2006) address concerns about self-selection bias and attempt to revise 
their earlier work accordingly.
11
 The outcome of their analysis suggests that even after controlling for the 
sample selection bias, countries with liberalized capital accounts experience a lower likelihood of 
speculative attacks. Glick and Hutchison (2010) present a new version of their earlier study. They expand 
the time coverage from 1975 to 2004 and apply duration-adjusted measures of capital control intensity to 
allow for changes in control programs over time. Their results re-emphasize their previous findings and 
assert that countries with less restrictive capital controls and more liberalized financial markets appear to 
be less vulnerable to speculative pressures. 
A possible cause of these  mixed empirical results could be attributed to the complexity of properly 
measuring the degree of openness or restrictions in cross-border financial transactions. The underlying 
source of data for conventional measures of quantifying financial openness is based upon the IMF’s de 
jure classifications, which are published in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER). However, this information is overly aggregated to fully capture the dynamics of 
                                                          
11. Self-selection bias points to the non-random choice of capital control programs. Countries that are facing considerable 
amount of pressure in their exchange markets are more likely to impose capital control programs and accordingly a 
positive correlation between capital controls and speculative attacks will be observed. 
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actual capital controls. Moreover, it is almost impossible to distinguish between de jure and de facto 
controls on capital account transactions. Consequently, the indices that are constructed to quantify the 
capital account restrictions, especially those that are dichotomous, fail to account for the intensity of 
capital controls. It is well known that measuring the extent of openness on capital account transactions is 
very complicated. 
Nonetheless, many studies rely on the IMF’s AREAER attempt to quantify the degree of financial 
openness and measure the impact or determinants of capital controls. Chinn and Ito (2005) present an 
index for measuring the degree of capital account openness. The Chinn-Ito index is based on a five-year 
moving average of the de jure binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restriction on cross-
border transactions. This index attempts to measure the intensity of capital controls. The latest update of 
this index covers 182 countries for the period of 1970-2009. The index is constructed in such a way that 
the series has a mean of zero and country values range from -1.844 to 2.478, where the higher values 
indicate a greater intensity of restrictions on capital account transactions.  Chinn and Ito (2008) provide 
details on how their index is constructed and compare it with other existing measures in the literature. 
4. Data and methodology 
This paper analyzes the incidence of currency crises for 21 countries with the help of an unbalanced panel 
of quarterly data over the period of 1970 through 1998. The countries in our sample includes: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
These countries share common similarities and provide higher frequency data for our empirical models. 
Episodes of currency crises come from Karimi and Voia (2011a); “Identifying Extreme Values of 
Exchange Market Pressure”.  These episodes correspond to the extreme values of exchange market 
pressure indices. The indices are constructed on the basis of monthly and quarterly data. Accordingly, two 
different types of crisis episodes are obtained: monthly-type and quarterly-type.
12
  
We employ the empirical models of the determinants of currency crises, which are presented in Karimi 
and Voia (2011b) – “Empirics of Currency Crises: A Duration Analysis Approach” – as the benchmark 
and examine how the likelihood of currency crises change under de jure and de facto exchange rate 
regimes. We also study the role of capital mobility and test for currency stability under free and restricted 
capital flows. In particular, we investigate the impact of different combinations of exchange rate 
                                                          
12. Since little monthly data is available to run our empirical models, the monthly incidences of crisis are expanded to 
contain the relevant quarters. Hence, the monthly-type crisis episodes suggest that at least one month within that quarter is 
recognized as the incidence of a crisis. 
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arrangements and capital controls on the hazard of speculative attacks. The continuous semi-parametric 
Cox proportional hazard models are our main methodology in pursuing these objectives.  
Our index for de jure exchange rate regimes is the same as the IMF’s classification. For the choice of a de 
facto regimes index, we have some options available. However, there is no systemic methodology to 
choose and/or evaluate the existing alternative systems. Moreover, as Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia 
(2011) point out, during periods of currency volatility, different de facto classifications tend to produce 
different results. Hence, they advise investigators to be particularly careful when attempting to link de 
facto regimes to financial crises. Thus, considering the time coverage of the de facto regimes, we employ 
both RR and LYS classifications in an attempt to capture the probable discrepancies. We adopt the coarse 
classification of RR and LYS and divide the exchange rate arrangements into three categories: (1) fixed, 
(2) intermediate, and; (3) floating regimes.
13
 On this ground, we construct the categorical variables of 
exchange rate regimes: , , and .
14
 Each country (i) at time t is assigned to 
one of these categories based on RR or LYS classifications. 
We utilize the Chin-Ito index as our measure of capital account restrictions. This index, to some extent, 
can capture the intensity of capital mobility restrictions and enjoys a wide coverage across counties and 
time. On the basis of this index, we construct a dummy variable for capital controls ( ). A 
capital account is classified as open –  takes the value of one – if the value of the Chinn-
Ito index is more than the average of similar countries during that period of time.
15
 Otherwise, it is 
classified as restricted and  takes the value of zero.
16
 
To examine the impact of different exchange rate regimes under the presence or absence of capital 
controls, we combine the exchange rate classifications with the capital account policies and categorize our 
sample into six different regimes (three different exchange rate classifications with two capital account 
choices). Consequently, we construct two series of six categorical variables (one for RR-based and the 
other for LYS-based classifications), which are introduced in the following section. 
Before we move on to our empirical results, we should point out that we are fully aware of the problems 
of reverse causation. This paper deals with the impact of exchange rate regimes and capital account 
                                                          
13. RR and LYS datasets are respectively available at:  
http://www.carmenreinhart.com/research/publications-by-topic/exchange-rates-and-dollarization/, and: 
http://www.utdt.edu/ver_contenido.php?id_contenido=4643&id_item_menu=8006. 
14. Since we have two indexes for exchange rate regimes, RR and LYS, we construct two series of categorical variables. 
15. All countries in our sample are categorized as advanced economies except for South Africa and some years in case of 
Greece and Portugal, which are categorized as emerging economies. The average value of the Chinn-Ito index for 
industrialized countries equals 0.257, 0.804, and 2.152 over the periods of 1970-79, 1980-89, and 1990-99, respectively. 
16. The Chinn-Ito index dataset is available at http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm. 
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policies on the occurrence of currency crises, not the other way around. To mitigate the potential problem 
of reverse causality (the impact of crises on exchange rate and capital regimes), we use lagged variables. 
Hence, the exchange rate regimes and capital account openness variables enter into the models with at 
least a one-period lag. This remedy to the potential problem of reverse causality is also useful to treat the 
potential interdependence between the choice of exchange rate regimes and capital account liberalization 
policies. In order to deal with this concern, we recognize and control for the duration of the policy mix 
composed of the exchange rate regimes and capital control programs. It is in line with the recent studies 
in the literature. 
5. Empirical results 
In this section, first, we empirically investigate the links between the probability of a currency crisis and 
the choice of exchange rate regimes. Then, we evaluate the impact of capital mobility on the stability of 
exchange rates. Finally, we examine how the likelihood of currency crises changes under different 
combinations of exchange rate regimes and capital controls. 
5.1. Exchange rate regimes and currency crises 
As a first step, we find how the incidences of different exchange rate regimes are distributed across our 
sample. As Table 1 presents, the IMF de jure system classifies major portion of the sample as the 
intermediate regimes compared to the fixed and floating arrangements. The same pattern is even more 
pronounced under the RR de facto classification (it should not be surprising knowing that RR relies on the 
IMF classification). However, LYS de facto system assigns more quarters to the corner regimes – fixed or 
floats –than the intermediate regimes. 
In the next step, we figure out how the monthly and quarterly-type of currency crisis episodes are jointly 
scattered with the exchange rate arrangements and calculate the unconditional probability of currency 
crisis under different exchange rate regimes. From the reported results in Table 2, it is evident that when 
the regimes are categorized based upon de jure classification the differences between the calculated 
probabilities for currency crisis incidences under different exchange rate regimes are negligible. Yet, the 
probabilities that are calculated under de facto classifications show significant results, but different 
according to the chosen classification. When regimes are categorized by the LYS classification, the 
intermediate exchange rate arrangements are the least susceptible regime to the speculative attacks. 
However, when regimes are categorized by the RR classification, the fixed arrangements are the most 
sustainable exchange rates. To verify that the results are statistically significant and not random or due to 
differences in sample sizes, we run Chi-square independence test (not reported) and log-rank test. Both  
13 
 
 Table 1. Incidence of Exchange Rate Regimes under different classifications 
  
de jure (IMF) 
 
de facto (LYS 
ᴥ
) 
 
de facto (RR) 
      quarters share (%)    quarters share (%)    Quarters share (%)   
Fix 
 
696 28.57 
 
796 45.64 
 
615 25.25 
 Intermediate 1040 42.69 
 
344 19.72 
 
1654 67.90 
 Float 
 
700 28.74 
 
604 34.63 
 
167 6.86 
 
           Total  
 
2436 100.00 
 
1744 100.00 
 
2436 100.00   
ᴥLYS classification starts from 1974 and contains several unclassified observations. 
  
Table 2. Unconditional probability of crisis under different Exchange Rate Regime classifications 
 
monthly-type  
 
quarterly-type  
  IMF LYS RR   IMF LYS RR 
Fix (t-1) 9.91 9.57 5.63 
 
7.18 5.87 4.03 
Intermediate (t-1) 10.14 7.87 12.11 
 
6.24 4.37 8.3 
Float (t-1)  10.39 12.69 6.10 
 
7.79 10.02 4.27 
        Log-rank test
ᴥ 
1.36 5.81 18.63 
 
1.39 11.70 11.25 
P-value 0.51 0.06 0.00 
 
0.50 0.00 0.00 
Probabilities are calculated by dividing the number of crises under a particular regime to the total number of regime-
quarters. All numbers are in percent, except for the Long-rank test results. 
ᴥThe null hypothesis of log-rank test is whether the hazard functions are equal across different groups. 
tests produce similar results and confirm our findings. The same structure is observable for both of the 
monthly and quarterly-type spells.  
In addition, to obtain a visual understanding of the dynamics of the hazards under different exchange rate 
regimes, we present the smoothed estimations of the non-parametric hazards in Figure 1. In the diagrams 
of this figure, the vertical axis measures the probability that a currency exits a tranquil state and enters 
into a crisis state, while the horizontal axis represents the successive number of quarters spent in 
tranquility. The presented diagrams reconfirm the pattern that we observed in Table 2. When regimes are 
categorized based on the RR classification, the hazard of crises is at the highest level for the intermediate 
regimes.  However, when regimes are classified under the LYS alternative system, the outcomes inverted 
and the intermediate regimes enjoy the lowest probability of attack (especially for the quarterly-type 
spells). Similar to the Table 2 results, the hazards that are built upon the IMF classification do not show a 
clear pattern. It should also be useful to mention that the observed non-monotonic nature of the hazards in 
Figure 1 validates our choice of semi-parametric Cox models.  
Now, we apply the Cox proportional hazard models to evaluate formally the contribution of the choice of 
exchange rate regimes to the occurrence of currency crises. We adapt the models that are used in Karimi  
14 
 
Figure 1. Monthly and quarterly-type smoothed hazards under different exchange rate regimes 
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and Voia (2011b) by entering the exchange rate regime categorical variables. As in our previous paper, 
we run four different models for each monthly and quarterly-type spells. Variables in models 1 and 2 are 
contemporaneous while in models 3 and 4 they are lagged by  one quarter. In models 1 and 3 the variables 
of each country are measured on their own, while all time-varying variables in models 2 and 3 are 
measured relative to the reference countries – Germany or the U.S.  The results related to the RR and LYS 
classifications are presented in tables 3 through 6.
17
 The results related to the IMF classification are not 
statistically significant whether monthly or quarterly-type models are being used, and hence are not 
reported here.  
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results for monthly-type models of RR and LYS classifications.
18
 
An examination of the reported results in Table 3 reveals that the hazard of fixed exchange rate regimes is 
significantly lower than the hazard of intermediate exchange rate regimes in all of the four RR-based 
monthly-type models. The hazard of fixed regimes is also lower than the hazard of float regimes; 
however, in two of these models the difference is statistically significant. On the other hand, the results of 
Table 4 show that the hazard of intermediate exchange rate regimes is significantly lower than the hazard 
of fixed exchange rate regimes in two of the four LYS-based monthly-type models. Furthermore, in three 
of these models, the hazard of intermediate regimes is significantly lower than the hazard of float regimes. 
In both Tables 3 and 4, some control variables (trade linkages, inflation, unemployment volatility, and the 
financial account ratio to GDP) are repeatedly significant in all models and have the expected sign. 
Tables 5 and 6 provide the estimation results for quarterly-type models of RR and LYS classifications. 
The results that they present are similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 4. Table 5 shows that when the 
episodes of currency crisis are identified with lower frequency data, the hazard of fixed exchange rate 
regimes is significantly lower than the hazard of intermediate exchange rate regimes in three of the four 
RR-based models. However, in all LYS-based quarterly-type models, the hazard of intermediate regimes 
is significantly lower than that of fixed and floating exchange regimes. Among the control variables, 
inflation is statistically significant in most of the models. 
It is clear that in our sample there is a statistically significant link between the choice of an exchange rate 
regime and the occurrence of currency crises. Nevertheless, the results are sensitive to the choice of de 
facto exchange rate system. Fixed exchange rate regimes are the least susceptible exchange arrangement 
to speculative attacks, if the exchange rate regimes are determined by the RR classification, while  
                                                          
17. From what we perceived in Figure 1, the Fix exchange rate regimes are chosen as the base in our RR-based categorical  
variables while the Intermediate exchange rate regimes are assigned as the base for LYS-based categorical variables.  
18. The models are interacted with different linear and non-linear time functions. The presented estimation results are the 
outcome of the interaction with a logarithmic form of time.   
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Table 3. Cox proportional hazard estimation (monthly-type spells) under RR de facto classifications 
 Variable 
Contemporaneous 
 
Lagged 
Model (I) Model (II)   Model (III) Model (IV) 
Fix is the base 
     
Intermediate 1.37* 1.5* 
 
1.11* 1.15* 
(1.9) (1.79) 
 
(1.65) (1.71) 
Float 1.69* 2.15** 
 
0.68 1.22 
(1.91) (2.27) 
 
(078) (1.28) 
Unemployment volatility  0.03 0.04** 
 
0.05** 0.07** 
(1.38) (2.22) 
 
(2.03) (2.45) 
Previous crises 
 
   
0.4* 
    
(1.68) 
Size of economy 0.83** 
  
0.76** 1.04** 
(2.39) 
  
(2.1) (2.52) 
Whole period GDP growth  
 
0.02** 
 
0.02 0.01 
 
(2.1) 
 
(1.38) (1.25) 
 
GDP growth rate 0.00 -0.01 
 
-0.06 -0.07 
(-0.05) (-0.17) 
 
(-0.79) (-0.87) 
Inflation 0.26*** 0.23** 
 
0.04 0.2** 
(3.21) (2.3) 
 
(0.45) (2.24) 
Unemployment rate 0.00 -0.02 
 
-0.01 -0.03 
(0.11) (-0.98) 
 
(-0.4) (-1.15) 
Share price index growth  -0.03*** -0.01 
 
-0.01 0.01 
(-3.34) (-0.64) 
 
(-0.62) (0.7) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.00 0.01 
 
0.01* 0.01** 
(-0.17) (0.31) 
 
(1.71) (2.53) 
Money growth -0.03** -0.05*** 
 
0.01 -0.01 
(-2.44) (-3.4) 
 
(0.48) (-0.61) 
Real domestic credit growth 0.04*** 0.05*** 
 
0.02 0.02* 
(3.61) (3.6) 
 
(1.23) (1.68) 
Trade openness 0.29 0.04** 
 
0.13 0.03 
(0.69) (2.59) 
 
(0.28) (1.58) 
Current account / GDP -0.02 0.00 
 
-0.09* 0.00 
(-0.46) (-1.63) 
 
(-1.96) (-0.61) 
Capital account / GDP 0.28 0.00 
 
-0.74 0.00 
(0.84) (-0.42) 
 
(-0.85) (-0.51) 
Financial account / GDP 0.07** 0.00** 
 
-0.11* 0.00*** 
(2.3) (-2.08) 
 
(-1.92) (-2.88) 
Budget deficit / GDP 0.02** 0.00 
 
0.02 0.00 
(2.54) (0.16) 
 
(1.38) (-0.13) 
Trade linkages  0.11** 0.14** 
 
0.12** 0.14* 
(2.43) (2.47) 
 
(2.28) (1.88) 
Financial linkages -0.02 -0.02 
 
0.00 0.00 
(-0.93) (-0.88) 
 
(-0.1) (-0.13) 
Macroeconomic similarities 0.05 0.06 
 
0.01 -0.03 
(1.03) (1.00) 
 
(0.11) (-0.38) 
 
Log likelihood -184.78 -136.55 
 
-185.68 -132.83 
The values in parentheses below estimates are the corresponding z-statistics.  
***, (**), [*] imply estimates are significant at 1, (5), and [10] percent. 
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Table 4. Cox proportional hazard estimation (monthly-type spells) under LYS de facto classifications 
 Variable 
Contemporaneous 
 
Lagged 
Model (I) Model (II)   Model (III) Model (IV) 
Intermediate is the base 
     
Fix 1.45** 0.89 
 
1.15 1.82** 
(2.19) (1.16) 
 
(1.64) (2.3) 
Float 1.03* 0.83 
 
1.3** 1.39* 
(1.66) (1.1) 
 
(1.97) (1.72) 
Unemployment volatility  0.07** 0.03 
 
0.06** 0.09** 
(2.51) (1.44) 
 
(2.27) (2.52) 
Previous crises 
 
   
-0.04 
    
(-0.21) 
Size of economy 1.44** 
  
0.92* 1.34** 
(2.47) 
  
(1.71) (2.4) 
Whole period GDP growth  
 
0.01 
 
-0.00 -0.01 
 
(0.48) 
 
(-0.06) (-0.35) 
 
GDP growth rate -0.05 -0.15 
 
0.04 -0.03 
(-0.44) (-1.41) 
 
(0.32) (-0.31) 
Inflation 0.48*** 0.13 
 
0.3** 0.44*** 
(4.06) (0.87) 
 
(2.28) (2.78) 
Unemployment rate 0.03 0.01 
 
0.03 0.03 
(1.17) (0.36) 
 
(1.05) (0.92) 
Share price index growth  -0.03** 0.00 
 
-0.02 0.02 
(-2.65) (0.2) 
 
(-1.16) (1.08) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.01 0.00 
 
0.02** 0.03*** 
(1.27) (-0.01) 
 
(2.16) (3.33) 
Money growth -0.03** -0.04** 
 
-0.04 -0.03 
(2.39) (-2.46) 
 
(-0.94) (-1.17) 
Real domestic credit growth 0.04*** 0.05*** 
 
0.02 0.03* 
(3.41) (3.04) 
 
(1.01) (2.14) 
Trade openness 0.3 0.07*** 
 
0.36 0.04 
(0.58) (3.3) 
 
(0.61) (1.09) 
Current account / GDP 0.01 0.00 
 
-0.1* 0.00 
(0.13) (-1.41) 
 
(-1.66) (-0.73) 
Capital account / GDP 0.12 0.00 
 
-1.82 0.00 
(0.38) (0.26) 
 
(-1.22) (-0.86) 
Financial account / GDP 0.06* 0.00* 
 
-0.12** 0.00** 
(1.7) (-1.79) 
 
(-2.04) (-2.46) 
Budget deficit / GDP 0.02** 0.00 
 
0.01 0.00 
(2.37) (0.05) 
 
(0.89) (-1.45) 
Trade linkages  0.12** 0.14** 
 
0.18** 0.21*** 
(2.32) (2.07) 
 
(2.18) (3.4) 
Financial linkages -0.01 0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 
(-0.25) (0.48) 
 
(0.59) (0.5) 
Macroeconomic similarities 0.05 0.08 
 
-0.06 -0.08 
(1.16) (1.18) 
 
(-0.76) (-1.6) 
 
Log likelihood -118.28 -91.9 
 
-124.01 -95.29 
The values in parentheses below estimates are the corresponding z-statistics.  
***, (**), [*] imply estimates are significant at 1, (5), and [10] percent. 
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Table 5. Cox proportional hazard estimation (quarterly-type spells) under RR de facto classifications 
 Variable 
Contemporaneous 
 
Lagged 
Model (I) Model (II)   Model (III) Model (IV) 
Fix is the base 
     
Intermediate 1.2* 1.95* 
 
1.45* 0.43 
(1.7) (1.95) 
 
(1.75) (0.47) 
Float 1.27 1.99* 
 
1.51 0.17 
(1.52) (1.87) 
 
(1.5) (0.16) 
Unemployment volatility  0.01 0.00 
 
0.00 0.02 
(0.26) (-0.18) 
 
(0.04) (0.64) 
Previous crises 
 
   
-0.4 
    
(-1.21) 
Size of economy 0.39 
  
0.44 0.36 
(1.1) 
  
(1.11) (0.83) 
Whole period GDP growth  
 
0.00 
 
0.00 0.01 
 
(0.33) 
 
(-0.02) (0.49) 
 
GDP growth rate -0.04 0.02 
 
0.07 0.06 
(-0.41) (0.2) 
 
(0.81) (0.6) 
Inflation 0.2** 0.16* 
 
0.1 0.21* 
(2.04) (1.85) 
 
(1.15) (1.66) 
Unemployment rate 0.01 0.1 
 
0.03 0.04 
(0.39) (0.49) 
 
(1.23) (1.45) 
Share price index growth  -0.01 0.00 
 
-0.02* 0.00 
(-1.62) (-0.34) 
 
(-1.68) (-0.51) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.00 -0.01 
 
0.01 0.01* 
(-0.41) (-0.24) 
 
(1.44) (1.74) 
Money growth -0.02 -0.04*** 
 
-0.01 0.00 
(-1.43) (-2.61) 
 
(-0.45) (-0.02) 
Real domestic credit growth 0.03* 0.01 
 
0.04 0.04 
(1.92) (0.02) 
 
(1.54) (1.35) 
Trade openness 0.01 0.02 
 
0.18 0.04* 
(0.31) (0.83) 
 
(0.4) (1.9) 
Current account / GDP 0.02 0.00 
 
0.02 0.00 
(0.72) (0.43) 
 
(0.36) (0.05) 
Capital account / GDP 0.19 0.00 
 
-2.28** 0.00 
(0.39) (0.8) 
 
(-2.19) (0.8) 
Financial account / GDP -0.01 0.00 
 
-0.02 -0.02 
(-0.39) (0.24) 
 
(-0.32) (-0.71) 
Budget deficit / GDP 0.01 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
(1.19) (0.73) 
 
(0.45) (0.49) 
Trade linkages  0.1 0.15 
 
0.13 0.22 
(0.84) (1.55) 
 
(1.25) (1.35) 
Financial linkages 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
(-1.41) (-0.95) 
 
(-1.46) (-0.84) 
Macroeconomic similarities 0.05 -0.15 
 
0.05 -0.09 
(0.43) (-0.16) 
 
(0.43) (-0.56) 
 
Log likelihood -124.79 -106.2 
 
-114.47 -95.74 
The values in parentheses below estimates are the corresponding z-statistics.  
***, (**), [*] imply estimates are significant at 1, (5), and [10] percent. 
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Table 6. Cox proportional hazard estimation (quarterly-type spells) under LYS de facto classifications 
 Variable 
Contemporaneous 
 
Lagged 
Model (I) Model (II)   Model (III) Model (IV) 
Intermediate is the base 
     
Fix 3.14*** 2.57*** 
 
-2.89** 3.53*** 
(3.17) (3.21) 
 
(-2.09) (-3.56) 
Float 2.8*** 2.8*** 
 
3.33** 2.74*** 
(2.94) (3.82) 
 
(2.48) (3.34) 
Unemployment volatility  0.04 0.01 
 
0.03 0.02 
(1.46) (0.41) 
 
(0.9) (0.83) 
Previous crises 
 
   
-0.76** 
    
(-2.18) 
Size of economy 0.74* 
  
0.76 0.68 
(1.68) 
  
(1.15) (1.5) 
Whole period GDP growth  
 
-0.01 
 
-0.04 -0.02 
 
(-0.63) 
 
(-1.61) (-0.96) 
 
GDP growth rate 0.04 0.05 
 
0.08 0.17* 
(0.36) (0.48) 
 
(0.65) (1.95) 
Inflation 0.49*** 0.3*** 
 
0.42** 0.27** 
(4.05) (2.8) 
 
(2.7) (2.06) 
Unemployment rate 0.04 0.03 
 
0.12*** 0.6** 
(1.44) (1.07) 
 
(3.067) (2.27) 
Share price index growth  -0.01 0.01 
 
-0.02** -0.02 
(-1.26) (0.44) 
 
(-2.09) (-1.39) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.02 0.01 
 
0.02** 0.02** 
(1.47) (0.98) 
 
(2.27) (2.23) 
Money growth -0.05* -0.05*** 
 
-0.01 -0.02 
(-1.79) (-2.9) 
 
(-0.25) (-0.9) 
Real domestic credit growth -0.01 0.00 
 
0.06** 0.05* 
(-0.19) (-0.03) 
 
(2.04) (1.85) 
Trade openness 0.03* 0.02 
 
1.11 0.03 
(1.79) (0.81) 
 
(1.15) (1.14) 
Current account / GDP -0.01 0.00 
 
-0.02 0.00 
(-0.15) (1.02) 
 
(-0.24) (-0.36) 
Capital account / GDP 0.16 0.00 
 
-3.06** 0.00 
(0.51) (1.02) 
 
(-2.27) (0.55) 
Financial account / GDP -0.01 0.00 
 
-0.03 0.00 
(-0.56) (0.38) 
 
(-0.46) (0.95) 
Budget deficit / GDP 0.01 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
(0.81) (0.86) 
 
(0.81) (-0.98) 
Trade linkages  0.19 0.35*** 
 
0.19 0.09 
(1.02) (2.9) 
 
(1.33) (0.84) 
Financial linkages 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
(-0.6) (0.01) 
 
(-1.07) (-0.76) 
Macroeconomic similarities -0.02 -0.12 
 
0.08 0.11 
(-0.13) (-1.08) 
 
(0.62) (1.02) 
 
Log likelihood -76.1 -75.9 
 
-67.35 -66.49 
The values in parentheses below estimates are the corresponding z-statistics.  
***, (**), [*] imply estimates are significant at 1, (5), and [10] percent. 
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intermediate exchange rate regimes will experience the least number of currency crisis incidences, if the 
exchange rate regimes are determined with the help of the LYS classification. The Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) indicates a better fitness of data for all LYS-based models compared to RR-based models. 
However, determining the outcome of which de facto system is more appropriate, definitely, requires a 
methodology that is more comprehensive and, ideally, looks to determine how close these systems are to 
the “true” regimes.   
We run several robustness tests to verify whether our adopted methodology is appropriate and the 
obtained results are consistent. In the first step, we run four different models on each of monthly and 
quarterly-type spells. The observed consistency of the results is a sign of the stability of the models and 
the reliability of their results. Then, we run Schoenfeld residual test to check whether the hazards are truly 
proportional and, hence, if applying Cox models is appropriate. The test results (not reported) show that 
almost in all monthly and quarterly-type models (both RR-based and LYS-based) all covariates are 
proportional and, thus, confirm that it is appropriate to apply the Cox models to be applied to our sample. 
We also checked the sensitivity of our results with respect to the tied spells and ran our models with two 
alternative methods: the Efron and marginal calculations. The obtained results (not reported) from both 
methods are similar and do not indicate any significant issue related to the tied spells. Finally, we 
examined our results for the existence of unobservable heterogeneity. The test results did not show any 
unobservable heterogeneity between the countries in our sample. 
5.2. Capital mobility and currency crises 
We start our investigation by examining the types of capital accounts, which are categorized with the help 
of the Chinn-Ito index, and figuring how the restricted and open-type of capital accounts have been 
distributed across our sample. As Table 7 presents, open and restricted-type of capital accounts have 
almost an equal share in our sample. However, the unconditional probability of currency crisis episodes 
with different types of capital accounts shows that more incidences of speculative attack have taken place 
during the periods of time that are categorized as restricted-type of capital accounts. We also run log rank 
test and Chi-square independence test (not reported) and verify that observed differences between the 
calculated probabilities of currency crises for different types of capital accounts are statistically 
significant. Table 7 reports the results. 
Figure 2 visualizes the hazards of currency crises for different types of capital accounts. The presented 
diagrams confirm the observed pattern in Table 7 for both monthly and quarterly-type spells. We also run 
the Cox proportional hazard models (the restricted-type model being chosen as the base) without any 
control variables. The results (reported in Table 7) are in line with our previous findings and indicate that 
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Table 7. Distribution of Capital Account Type and incidences of currency crisis 
  
Chinn-Ito index 
 
monthly-type spells 
 
quarterly-type spells 
      quarters share (%)   probability stcox   probability stcox   
Restricted   1116 48.69 
 
0.12 
  
0.08 
 
 Open 
 
1176 51.31 
 
0.08 -0.32** 
 
0.06 -0.28* 
 
  
    
(-2.34) 
  
(-1.73) 
 
  
        
 Log-rank test 
ᴥ
 
   
6.42 
  
3 
 
 P-value   
   
0.01 
  
0.08 
 
  
ᴥThe null hypothesis of log-rank test is whether the hazard functions are equal across different groups. 
For the Cox proportional hazard estimations, the restricted-type is the base.  
The values in parentheses below estimates are the corresponding z-statistics.  
***, (**), [*] imply estimates are significant at 1, (5), and [10] percent. 
 
the baseline hazards of open-type capital accounts are lower than the baseline hazards of restricted-type. 
However, when we apply the Cox proportional hazard models with our set of control variables, strikingly, 
the obtained results will be different from what we found in Table 7 and Figure 2. According to the results 
presented in Tables 8 and 9, the hazards of open-type capital accounts are higher than the hazards of 
restricted-type capital accounts, although this relation is statistically significant only in the monthly-type 
spells (models 1, 2, and 3). Similar to our previous estimation results, some control variables such as 
inflation, trade linkages, unemployment volatility, and financial account ratio to GDP, are repeatedly 
significant and have the expected sign. 
The impact of capital account policies on the occurrence of currency crises demonstrates different results 
in our sample. While baseline hazard of open-type capital accounts are lower than the baseline hazard of  
Figure 2. Monthly and quarterly-type smoothed hazards under different exchange rate regimes 
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  Table 8. Cox proportional hazard estimation (monthly-type spells) under capital mobility 
 Variable 
Contemporaneous 
 
Lagged 
Model (I) Model (II)   Model (III) Model (IV) 
Restricted-type is the base 
     
Open-type 0.87* 0.89* 
 
0.77** 0.46 
(1.67) (1.82) 
 
(1.9) (1.02) 
Unemployment volatility  0.04** 0.04** 
 
0.05*** 0.07*** 
(1.65) (2.33) 
 
(2.79) (2.88) 
Previous crises 
 
   
0.19 
    
(1.08) 
Size of economy 0.72** 
  
0.59* 0.9** 
(1.97) 
  
(1.77) (2.29) 
Whole period GDP growth  0.02 0.03*** 
 
0.02* 0.02 
(1.15) (2.66) 
 
(1.76) (1.47) 
 
GDP growth rate 0.03 -0.04 
 
-0.04 -0.09 
(0.4) (-0.53) 
 
(-0.62) (-1.11) 
Inflation 0.33*** 0.4*** 
 
0.09 0.24*** 
(3.9) (3.27) 
 
(1.25) (2.64) 
Unemployment rate 0.00 -0.01 
 
0.01 -0.01 
(-0.38) (-0.36) 
 
(0.23) (-0.44) 
Share price index growth  -0.03*** -0.01 
 
-0.01 0.001 
(-3.41) (-0.61) 
 
(-0.9) (0.51) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.01 0.04 
 
0.02** 0.02*** 
(0.94) (0.94) 
 
(2.59) (3.38) 
Money growth -0.01 -0.05*** 
 
0.01 -0.01 
(-0.95) (-2.89) 
 
(0.56) (-0.6) 
Real domestic credit growth 0.03** 0.05*** 
 
0.02 0.03* 
(2.09) (3.33) 
 
(1.32) (1.98) 
Trade openness -0.12 0.04** 
 
-0.04 0.03* 
(-0.27) (2.5) 
 
(-0.1) (1.65) 
Current account / GDP -0.03 0.00* 
 
-0.1*** 0.00 
(-0.62) (-1.94) 
 
(-3.28) (-0.45) 
Capital account / GDP 0.14 0.00 
 
-0.72 0.00 
(0.43) (-0.14) 
 
(-1.37) (-0.48) 
Financial account / GDP 0.09* 0.00** 
 
-0.12* 0.00** 
(1.79) (-2.24) 
 
(-1.81) (2.46) 
Budget deficit / GDP 0.01 0.00 
 
0.01 0.00 
(1.62) (0.2) 
 
(0.66) (0.24) 
Trade linkages  0.12** 0.16*** 
 
0.14** 0.14* 
(2.3) (3.05) 
 
(2.15) (1.84) 
Financial linkages 0.01 0.00 
 
0.01 0.01 
(-0.32) (-0.05) 
 
(0.19) (0.25) 
Macroeconomic similarities 0.03 0.04 
 
0.02 -0.03 
(0.61) (0.76) 
 
(0.45) (-0.45) 
 
Log likelihood -152.25 -136.67 
 
-152.02 -131.22 
The values in parentheses below estimates are the corresponding z-statistics.  
***, (**), [*] imply estimates are significant at 1, (5), and [10] percent. 
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Table 9. Cox proportional hazard estimation (quarterly-type spells) under capital mobility 
 Variable 
Contemporaneous 
 
Lagged 
Model (I) Model (II)   Model (III) Model (IV) 
Restricted-type is the base 
     
Open-type 0.21 0.61 
 
0.44 0.72 
(0.41) (1.23) 
 
(0.77) (1.47) 
Unemployment volatility  0.05* 0.03 
 
0.5* 0.05 
(1.92) (1.08) 
 
(1.8) (1.46) 
Previous crises -0.26 
  
-0.5* -0.45 
(-1.12) 
  
(-1.9) (-1.28) 
Size of economy 0.51 0.23 
 
0.44 0.32 
(1.38) (0.63) 
 
(1.15) (0.9) 
Whole period GDP growth  
 
0.01 
  
0.01 
 
(0.6) 
  
(0.61) 
 
GDP growth rate 0.02 0.04 
 
0.08 0.05 
(0.17) (0.57) 
 
(0.95) (0.61) 
Inflation 0.23*** 0.25** 
 
0.2** 0.31** 
(2.85) (2.32) 
 
(2.1) (2.44) 
Unemployment rate 0.02 0.02 
 
0.6** 0.04** 
(1.09) (0.76) 
 
(2.29) (1.98) 
Share price index growth  -0.01 0.00 
 
-0.01 -0.01 
(-1.19) (-0.34) 
 
(-1.31) (-0.58) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.01 0.00 
 
0.02** 0.01*** 
(0.81) (0.15) 
 
(2.32) (3.63) 
Money growth -0.01 -0.02* 
 
-0.02 -0.03 
(-1.02) (-1.76) 
 
(-0.88) (-1.56) 
Real domestic credit growth 0.03* -0.01 
 
0.06*** 0.07*** 
(1.71) (0.34) 
 
(2.81) (3.84) 
Trade openness 0.24 0.02 
 
0.3 0.04* 
(0.66) (1.25) 
 
(0.06) (1.93) 
Current account / GDP 0.00 0.00 
 
0.02 0.00 
(0.1) (0.07) 
 
(0.28) (0.18) 
Capital account / GDP 0.08 0.00 
 
-2.21** 0.00 
(0.21) (1.2) 
 
(-2.05) (0.97) 
Financial account / GDP -0.01 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
(-0.27) (0.45) 
 
(-0.05) (0.27) 
Budget deficit / GDP 0.01 0.00 
 
0.01 0.00 
(0.96) (0.4) 
 
(0.74) (1.02) 
Trade linkages  0.13 0.19** 
 
0.17* 0.19* 
(1.11) (2.24) 
 
(1.73) (1.71) 
Financial linkages 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
(-0.78) (-0.17) 
 
(-1.59) (-1.37) 
Macroeconomic similarities 0.03 -0.06 
 
0.05 -0.07 
(0.25) (-0.55) 
 
(0.47) (-0.61) 
 
Log likelihood -132.42 -112.35 
 
-117.76 -98.29 
The values in parentheses below estimates are the corresponding z-statistics.  
***, (**), [*] imply estimates are significant at 1, (5), and [10] percent. 
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restricted-type capital accounts, when we enter the set of control variables to our models, the hazard of 
open-type capital accounts appear to be higher than the hazard of restricted-type capital accounts. This 
relation is often statistically significant when the episodes of currency crises are identified with higher 
frequency – monthly – data. It can be taken as a sign that capital control policies could help in preventing 
low duration crises. The obtained results are robust to a variety of samples and models. We ran different 
models and received consistent results for both monthly and quarterly-type models. The results of 
Schoenfeld residual test (reported in Appendix A) show that a few covariates in some models do not 
individually pass the proportionality test; however, all models jointly pass the proportionality test. We 
also did sensitivity checks for the tied spells and found no significant differences between the results of 
the Efron and the marginal calculations. Finally, we tested our results for the existence of unobservable 
heterogeneity. The test results did not show any unobservable heterogeneity at the country level in our 
sample. 
5.3. Exchange rate regimes, capital mobility, and currency crises 
As the last step in our study, we examine how the hazard of speculative attack may change under different 
combinations of exchange rate regimes and capital account liberalization policies. We combine the 
exchange rate classifications with the capital control policies to construct two series of different 
categorical variables. The first series of categorical variables is based on RR and the second series is 
based on LYS classifications.  
In the first series, the categorical variables are constructed as: (1) Regime 1 (fixed with capital controls), 
(2) Regime 2 (fixed with no capital controls), (3) Regime 3 (intermediate with capital controls), (4) 
Regime 4 (intermediate with no capital controls), and, (5) Regime 5 (float with capital no controls).
19
 
While in the second series, the categorical variables are constructed as: (1) Regime 1 (intermediate with 
capital controls), (2) Regime 2 (intermediate with no capital controls), (3) Regime 3 (fixed with capital 
controls), (4) Regime 4 (fixed with no capital controls), (5) Regime 5 (float with capital controls), and, (6) 
Regime 6 (float with no capital controls).  
Tables 10 through 12 report the estimation results of the Cox proportional hazard models. According to 
the presented results in Tables 10 and 12 for the monthly and quarterly-type spells of the first and second 
series, the hazard of Regime 1is lower than the hazard of Regime 3 and this relation is often statistically 
significant. Regime 1 has also often a lower hazard compared to Regimes 4 and 5; however, these  
                                                          
19. Since the total observations for the “float with capital controls” combination in the first series are less than one percent 
of the sample, this combination is dropped from our categorical variables in the first series. 
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Table 10. Cox proportional hazard (monthly-type spells) under RR classification & capital policies 
 Variable 
Contemporaneous 
 
Lagged 
Model (I) Model (II)   Model (III) Model (IV) 
Regime 1 is the base 
     
Regime 2  omitted omitted 
 
omitted omitted 
     Regime 3  1.58* 1.47* 
 
1.33* 1.27 
(1.86) (1.77) 
 
(1.78) (1.57) 
Regime 4  0.49 0.00 
 
-0.10 0.64 
(0.51) (0.01) 
 
(-0.11) (0.66) 
Regime 5  1.54 1.74* 
 
-0.03 0.86 
(1.47) (1.79) 
 
(-0.04) (1.1) 
Unemployment volatility  0.04 0.05** 
 
0.06** 0.07** 
(1.49) (2.33) 
 
(2.26) (2.46) 
Previous crises  
 
   
0.41* 
 
   
(1.7) 
Size of economy 0.98** 
  
0.90** 1.12** 
(2.47) 
  
(2.18) (2.45) 
Whole period GDP growth  
 
0.03*** 
 
0.03** 0.02 
 
(2.67) 
 
(2.34) (1.39) 
 
GDP growth rate -0.02 -0.03 
 
-0.07 -0.10 
(-0.28) (-0.4) 
 
(-0.97) (-1.1) 
Inflation 0.38*** 0.43*** 
 
0.04 0.21* 
(3.67) (3.15) 
 
(0.43) (1.88) 
Unemployment rate 0.02 -0.02 
 
0.00 -0.02 
(0.91) (-0.8) 
 
(-0.15) (-0.7) 
Share price index growth  -0.03*** 0.00 
 
-0.01 0.01 
(-3.32) (0.01) 
 
(-0.87) (0.85) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.00 0.02 
 
0.02** 0.02** 
(-0.26) (0.49) 
 
(2.35) (2.42) 
Money growth -0.04 -0.11*** 
 
0.02 -0.01 
(-1.53) (-3.18) 
 
(0.63) (-0.4) 
Real domestic credit growth 0.06** 0.09*** 
 
0.02 0.03 
(2.01) (3.28) 
 
(0.9) (1.21) 
Trade openness 0.06 0.04** 
 
-0.66 0.03* 
(0.13) (2.42) 
 
(-1.04) (1.65) 
Current account / GDP -0.03 0.00 
 
-0.12** 0.00 
(-0.56) (-1.19) 
 
(-2.23) (-0.27) 
Capital account / GDP 0.36 0.00 
 
-1.08 0.00 
(1.08) (-0.64) 
 
(-0.99) (-0.49) 
Financial account / GDP 0.07* 0.00* 
 
-0.11 0.00** 
(1.84) (-1.79) 
 
(-1.54) (-2.16) 
Budget deficit / GDP 0.02** 0.00 
 
0.01 0.00 
(2.32) (0.34) 
 
(0.83) (-0.05) 
Trade linkages  0.14** 0.18** 
 
0.14** 0.16 
(2.32) (2.54) 
 
(2.14) (0.27) 
 
Log likelihood -112.01 -86.06 
 
-116.06 -90.83 
The values in parentheses below estimates are the corresponding z-statistics.  
***, (**), [*] imply estimates are significant at 1, (5), and [10] percent. 
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Table 11. Cox proportional hazard (monthly-type spells) under LYS classification & capital policies 
 Variable 
Contemporaneous 
 
Lagged 
Model (I) Model (II)   Model (III) Model (IV) 
Regime 1 is the base 
     
Regime 2  -1.08 -0.98 
 
-0.86 -1.16 
(-0.76) (-0.57) 
 
(-0.5) (-0.69) 
Regime 3  1.44* 0.5 
 
1.35 1.38 
(1.67) (0.45) 
 
(1.39) (1.21) 
Regime 4  omitted omitted 
 
omitted omitted 
     Regime 5  0.94 0.62 
 
1.43 0.87 
(1.14) (0.578) 
 
(1.53) (0.79) 
Regime 6  -0.49 -0.77 
 
0.79 0.7 
(-0.42) (-.53) 
 
(0.59) (0.52) 
Unemployment volatility  0.06** 0.03 
 
0.06** 0.08** 
(1.98) (1.36) 
 
(1.97) (2.31) 
Previous crises  
 
   
0.04 
 
   
(0.16) 
Size of economy 1.35** 
  
1.04 1.3** 
(2.07) 
  
(1.59) (2.09) 
Whole period GDP growth  
 
0.00 
 
-0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.19) 
 
(-0.39) (-0.53) 
 
GDP growth rate -0.08 -0.15 
 
0.07 -0.08 
(-0.64) (-1.27) 
 
(0.52) (-0.64) 
Inflation 0.54*** 0.16 
 
0.28** 0.48*** 
(3.99) (0.74) 
 
(2.05) (2.72) 
Unemployment rate 0.04* 0.02 
 
0.04 0.03 
(1.68) (0.54) 
 
(1.32) (0.84) 
Share price index growth  -0.03** 0.00 
 
-0.01 0.02 
(-2.39) (0.1) 
 
(-0.96) (1.3) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.1 0.00 
 
0.03*** 0.03*** 
(1.34) (0.05) 
 
(2.6) (2.88) 
Money growth -0.03** -0.09** 
 
-0.04 -0.04 
(-2.03) (-2.53) 
 
(-0.99) (-1.05) 
Real domestic credit growth 0.04*** 0.09*** 
 
0.3 0.04 
(3.34) (3.1) 
 
(1.00) (1.38) 
Trade openness 0.26 0.11*** 
 
0.22 0.04 
(0.47) (3.18) 
 
(0.32) (1.31) 
Current account / GDP -0.02 0.00 
 
-0.19** 0.00 
(-0.33) (-0.78) 
 
(-2.05) (-0.15) 
Capital account / GDP 0.11 0.00 
 
-3.55* 0.00 
(0.34) (0.21) 
 
(-1.73) (-0.75) 
Financial account / GDP 0.05 0.00* 
 
-0.16** 0.00* 
(1.42) (-1.94) 
 
(-2.3) (-1.7) 
Trade linkages  0.12** 0.18** 
 
0.24* 0.19** 
(2.21) (2.17) 
 
(1.84) (2.13) 
 
Log likelihood -114.94 -55.49 
 
-76.26 -63.74 
The values in parentheses below estimates are the corresponding z-statistics.  
***, (**), [*] imply estimates are significant at 1, (5), and [10] percent. 
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Table 12. Cox proportional hazard (quarterly-type spells) under RR classification & capital policies 
 Variable 
Contemporaneous 
 
Lagged 
Model (I) Model (II)   Model (III) Model (IV) 
Regime 1 is the base 
     
Regime 2  omitted omitted 
 
omitted omitted 
     Regime 3  1.48* 2.16** 
 
1.27 0.49 
(1.72) (2.14) 
 
(1.52) (0.53) 
Regime 4  0.61 0.85 
 
0.48 -0.42 
(0.58) (0.77) 
 
(0.45) (-0.42) 
Regime 5  0.43 1.86* 
 
1.06 0.05 
(1.35) (1.7) 
 
(0.99) (0.5) 
Unemployment volatility  0.03 0.01 
 
0.03 0.05 
(1.06) (0.4) 
 
(1.21) (1.58) 
Previous crises  
 
   
-0.45 
 
   
(-1.35) 
Size of economy 0.46 
  
0.51 0.38 
(1.13) 
  
(1.16) (0.81) 
Whole period GDP growth  
 
0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 
 
(0.85) 
 
(0.41) (0.76) 
 
GDP growth rate -0.02 -0.03 
 
0.04 0.03 
(-0.26) (-0.4) 
 
(0.43) (0.35) 
Inflation 0.22*** 0.24** 
 
0.15* 0.31** 
(2.67) (2.57) 
 
(1.89) (2.34) 
Unemployment rate 0.02 0.02 
 
0.04 0.04 
(0.86) (0.85) 
 
(1.48) (1.57) 
Share price index growth  -0.01 0.00 
 
-0.01 -0.01 
(-1.2) (0.01) 
 
(-1.3) (-0.48) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.00 -0.01 
 
0.01* 0.01 
(0.01) (0.85) 
 
(1.79) (1.64) 
Money growth -0.02 -0.04** 
 
-0.03 -0.03 
(-1.01) (-2.03) 
 
(-1.04) (-0.93) 
Real domestic credit growth 0.02 0.00 
 
0.07** 0.08** 
(1.39) (-0.08) 
 
(2.39) (2.54) 
Trade openness 0.26 0.02 
 
-0.13 0.03* 
(0.59) (1.29) 
 
(-0.23) (1.74) 
Current account / GDP 0.00 0.00 
 
0.02 0.00 
(0.05) (0.07) 
 
(0.31) (0.29) 
Capital account / GDP 0.18 0.00 
 
-2.35** 0.00 
(0.45) (0.55) 
 
(-2.02) (0.85) 
Financial account / GDP -0.01 0.00 
 
-0.01 -0.01 
(-0.29) (0.5) 
 
(-0.1) (-0.46) 
Budget deficit / GDP 0.01 0.00 
 
0.02 0.00 
(0.62) (0.46) 
 
(0.22) (0.67) 
Trade linkages  0.10 0.16 
 
0.17 0.21 
(0.81) (1.34) 
 
(1.44) (1.4) 
 
Log likelihood -102.84 -85.11 
 
-92.31 -77.95 
The values in parentheses below estimates are the corresponding z-statistics.  
***, (**), [*] imply estimates are significant at 1, (5), and [10] percent. 
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relations are scarcely statistically significant. The relation between Regime 1 and Regime 2 is problematic 
and omitted. These results are in line with our previous findings for the RR-based exchange rate regimes. 
Table 11 presents the results for the monthly-type spells of the second series. The results show that the 
hazard of Regime 1 is lower than the hazard of Regime 2 although the relation is not statistically 
significant. It implies that for the LYS-based models, the intermediate regimes may demonstrate lower 
hazard while there is less capital control. The hazard of Regime 1 is lower than the hazards of Regimes 3 
and 5 although scarcely statistically significant. The hazard of Regime 1 does not show a clear relation 
compared to the hazard of Regime 6. In general, these results are in line with our previous findings. The 
relation between Regime 1 and Regime 4 is problematic and omitted. The estimation of quarterly-type 
spells of the second series models are often not converging and not reported. 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we investigated whether there is a link between the choice of exchange rate regimes and the 
occurrence of currency crises. Our adopted methodology is duration analysis and the incidences of 
currency crisis come from 21 countries over the period 1970-1998. With the help of Cox proportional 
models, we tested how the likelihood of currency crises changes under the de jure and de facto exchange 
rate classifications. We also examined the role of capital mobility on the sustainability of the currencies.  
Our data indicates that there exists a meaningful link between the choice of exchange rate regime and the 
occurrence of currency crises. Nevertheless, the results are sensitive to the choice of the de facto 
exchange rate classification. While RR-based models show that fixed exchange rate arrangements are 
least susceptible to speculative attacks, LYS-based models point to the intermediate exchange rate 
regimes as the least crisis prone. Until a reliable methodology or empirical test is devised to evaluate the 
current de facto classifications, in a systematic way, it remains difficult to determine objectively which de 
facto classification is most appropriate. In the meantime, researchers can rely on the characteristics of 
individual countries and scrutinize the monetary system of the countries under surveillance to determine 
more precisely the classification of their exchange rate regimes. 
The data also shows that the impact of capital account policies on the occurrence of currency crises takes 
different directions. While the baseline hazard of open-type capital accounts is lower than the baseline 
hazard of restricted-type capital accounts, when we enter our set of control variables into the models, the 
hazard of open-type capital accounts appears to be higher than the hazard of restricted-type capital 
accounts. This relation is more significant for low duration crisis episodes and can be interpreted as a sign 
that capital control policies could help preventing currency crises. 
29 
 
References 
Bartolini, L., Drazen, A. (1997). Capital account liberalization as a signal. American Economic Review 
87(1), 138–154. 
 
Baxter, M., Stockman, A. (1989). Business cycles and the exchange-rate regime: some international 
evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics 23(3), 377–400. 
 
Bubula, A., Ötker-Robe, I. (2002). The evolution of exchange rate regimes since 1990: evidence from De 
Facto policies. IMF Working Paper 02/155. The International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
 
Bubula, A., Ötker-Robe, I. (2003). Are pegged and intermediate exchange rate regimes crisis prone? IMF 
Working Paper 03/229. The International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
 
Calvo, G., Reinhart, C. (2002). Fear of floating. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2), 379–408. 
 
Chinn, M.D., Ito, H. (2005). What matters for financial development? Capital controls, institutions, and 
interactions. NBER Working Paper 11370. 
 
Chinn, M. D., Ito, H. (2008). A new measure of financial openness. Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis 10(3), 309 - 322. 
  
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Detragiache, E. (1997). The determinants of banking crises: evidence from industrial 
and developing countries, Policy Research Working Paper 1828. The World Bank, Washington DC.  
 
Dooley, M., Isard, P. (1980). Capital controls, political risk, and deviations from interest rate parity. 
Journal of Political Economy 88(2), 370–384. 
 
Edwards, S. (1989). Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation and Adjustment: Exchange Rate Policy in 
Developing Economies. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
 
Eichengreen, B. (1994). International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century. The Brookings 
Institution, Washington DC. 
 
Eichengreen, B., Razo-Garcia, R. (2011). How reliable are de facto exchange rate regime classifications? 
NBER Working Paper 17318. 
 
Esaka, T. (2010a). Exchange rate regimes, capital controls, and currency crises: Does the bipolar view 
hold? Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money 20(1), 91-108. 
 
Esaka, T. (2010b). De facto exchange rate regimes and currency crises: Are pegged regimes with capital 
account liberalization really more prone to speculative attacks? Journal of Banking & Finance 34(11), 
1109-1128. 
 
Frenkel, R., Rapetti, M. (2007). Argentina’s monetary and exchange rate policies after the convertibility 
regime collapse. Center for Economic and Policy Research, Mimeo. 
 
Fischer, S. (2001). Exchange rate regimes: is the bipolar view correct? Journal of Economic Perspectives 
15(2), 3–24. 
 
30 
 
Glick, R., Hutchison, M. (2005). Capital controls and exchange rate instability in developing economies. 
Journal of International Money and Finance 24(3), 387–412. 
 
Glick, R., Guo, X., Hutchison, M. (2006). Currency crises, capital-account liberalization, and selection 
bias. Review of Economics and Statistics 88(4), 698–714. 
 
Glick, R., Hutchison, M. (2010). The Illusive Quest: Do International Capital Controls Contribute to 
Currency Stability? Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2010-15. 
 
Haile, F.D., Pozo, S. (2006). Exchange rate regime and currency crises: an evaluation using extreme value 
theory. Review of International Economics 14(4), 554–570. 
 
Ghosh, A., Gulde, A.M., Wolf, H. (2003). Exchange Rate Regimes: Choices and Consequences. MIT 
Press, Massachusetts. 
 
Husain, A.M., Mody, A., Rogoff, K.S. (2005). Exchange rate regime durability and performance in 
developing versus advanced economies. Journal of Monetary Economics 52(1), 35–64. 
 
Karimi, M., Voia, M.C. (2011a). Identifying extreme values of exchange market pressure. Carleton 
University, Mimeo. 
 
Karimi, M., Voia, M.C. (2011b). Empirics of currency crises: A duration analysis approach. Carleton 
University, Mimeo. 
 
Lavoie, M. (2001). The reflux mechanism in the open economy. In Rochon L. P. and M. Vernengo (Eds.), 
Credit, Interest Rates and the Open Economy: Essays on Horizontalism, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Levy-Yeyati, E., Sturzenegger, F., (2005). Classifying exchange rate regimes: Deeds vs. words. European 
Economic Review 49 (6), 1603–1635. 
 
Obstfeld, M., Taylor, A. M. (2005). Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Radelet, Steven and Jeffrey Sachs (2000). The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis. In Krugman, P., 
(Eds.), Currency Crises, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 105–162. 
 
Reinhart, C., Rogoff, K.S. (2004). The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: a reinterpretation. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (1), 1–48. 
 
Rogoff, K.S., Husain, A.M., Mody, A., Brooks, R., Oomes, N. (2004). Evolution and performance of 
exchange rate regimes, IMF Occasional Paper 229. The International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
 
Stiglitz, J.E. (2002). Capital market liberalization and exchange rate regimes: risk without reward,” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 579, 219–48. 
 
Tavlas, G., Dellas, H., Stockman, A.C. (2008). The classification and performance of alternate exchange 
rate systems. European Economic Review 52 (6), 941–963. 
 
Williamson, J. (2000). Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Markets: Reviving the Intermediate 
Options. Peterson Institute Press, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC. 
 
31 
 
Williamson, J. (2002). The evolution of thought on intermediate exchange rate regimes, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 579, 73–86. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Appendix: Schoenfeld residual test results for Capital Mobility models 
 
1. Test of proportional-hazard assumption for Model 1 (monthly-type) 
Time: Rank(t)         
  rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
0b.lfinop . . 1 . 
1.lfinop -0.00663 0 1 0.9593 
UnempgStdt~e 0.07839 0.45 1 0.5001 
tgdpg -0.01001 0.01 1 0.9352 
econsize 0.14409 1.1 1 0.2943 
newGDPg 0.00205 0 1 0.9848 
newreer 0.1657 1.53 1 0.2163 
newUnempR 0.014 0.02 1 0.8994 
newCPI1 -0.02943 0.05 1 0.8262 
newcShareP -0.05446 0.17 1 0.6763 
newMQMg 0.02345 0.05 1 0.831 
newRDMCRg -0.00685 0 1 0.9538 
newOPs -0.21498 1.98 1 0.1591 
newCAGDP -0.05256 0.06 1 0.8046 
newCPGDP -0.00232 0 1 0.987 
newFAGDP 0.05039 0.11 1 0.7411 
newBDGDP -0.0182 0.02 1 0.9 
newcompeti~n -0.09666 0.69 1 0.4067 
newfinance -0.12236 1.48 1 0.2237 
newmacsimi~P 0.09018 0.65 1 0.4211 
global test  8.15 19 0.985 
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2. Test of proportional-hazard assumption for Model 2 (monthly-type) 
Time: Rank(t)         
  rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
0b.lfinop . . 1 . 
1.lfinop -0.05859 0.27 1 0.6011 
UnempgStdt~e 0.00957 0.01 1 0.9314 
tgdpg 0.00891 0.01 1 0.9233 
newdGDPg 0.04962 0.5 1 0.4816 
newdreervol 0.12546 1.25 1 0.2629 
newdUnempR -0.04184 0.12 1 0.7318 
newdCPI1 0.00559 0 1 0.9485 
newdcShareP 0.02742 0.11 1 0.7401 
newdMQMg 0.0418 0.28 1 0.5973 
newdRDMCRg -0.01431 0.03 1 0.8641 
newdOPsg -0.00156 0 1 0.9873 
newdCAGDP -0.00536 0 1 0.9719 
newdCPGDP -0.08228 0.19 1 0.666 
newdFAGDP 0.02259 0.05 1 0.8261 
newdBDGDP -0.02044 0.06 1 0.8085 
newcompeti~n 0.03663 0.06 1 0.8085 
newfinance -0.14868 2.91 1 0.0879 
newmacsimi~P 0.02337 0.04 1 0.8447 
global test  10.65 18 0.9087 
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3. Test of proportional-hazard assumption for Model 3 (monthly-type) 
Time: Rank(t)         
  rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
0b.lfinop . . 1 . 
1.lfinop 0.06161 1.05 1 0.3059 
UnempgStdt~e -0.11276 4.51 1 0.0337 
tgdpg -0.01546 0.03 1 0.8552 
econsize -0.09165 0.76 1 0.3831 
newlGDPg 0.02367 0.06 1 0.8081 
newlreer 0.13003 2.74 1 0.0977 
newlUnempR 0.02933 0.09 1 0.7583 
newlCPI1 -0.10371 0.95 1 0.3307 
newlcShareP -0.1288 2.84 1 0.0919 
newlMQMg -0.04661 0.58 1 0.4454 
newlRDMCRg 0.06423 2.47 1 0.1163 
newlOPs -0.20579 3.13 1 0.0768 
newlCAGDP 0.03758 0.74 1 0.3913 
newlCPGDP -0.00734 0.01 1 0.9402 
newlFAGDP -0.06897 0.8 1 0.3698 
newlBDGDP -0.0554 1.68 1 0.1949 
newcompeti~n -0.17811 6.66 1 0.0099 
newfinance -0.08823 2.44 1 0.118 
newtmacsim~g 0.18251 7.06 1 0.0079 
global test  14.2 19 0.7718 
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4. Test of proportional-hazard assumption for Model 4 (monthly-type) 
Time: Rank(t)         
  rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
0b.finop . . 1 . 
1.finop -0.12775 0.63 1 0.4287 
UnempgStdt~e -0.01059 0.01 1 0.9289 
tgdpg -0.06641 0.22 1 0.6355 
PCris -0.00593 0 1 0.9699 
econsize 0.07831 0.32 1 0.5709 
newldGDPg 0.06657 0.2 1 0.656 
newldreer 0.11689 0.5 1 0.4792 
newldUnempR 0.08418 0.31 1 0.5787 
newldCPI1 -0.11895 0.44 1 0.5047 
newldcShareP 0.03233 0.07 1 0.7861 
newldMQMg 0.02466 0.03 1 0.858 
newldRDMCRg 0.04577 0.2 1 0.6508 
newldOPs -0.06564 0.29 1 0.5896 
newldCAGDP -0.10531 0.38 1 0.5394 
newldCPGDP 0.04185 0.05 1 0.821 
newldFAGDP 0.057 0.09 1 0.7669 
newldBDGDP -0.01488 0 1 0.951 
newcompeti~n -0.10164 0.84 1 0.3582 
newfinance -0.19402 3.4 1 0.0652 
newtmacsim~g 0.09867 0.81 1 0.3687 
global test  9.43 20 0.9774 
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5. Test of proportional-hazard assumption for Model 1 (quarterly-type) 
Time: Rank(t)         
  rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
0b.lfinop . . 1 . 
1.lfinop -0.10148 0.6 1 0.4401 
UnempgStdt~e -0.16607 1.45 1 0.2279 
econsize 0.03504 0.07 1 0.7968 
PCris 0.09942 0.56 1 0.4526 
newGDPg -0.10848 0.86 1 0.355 
newreer 0.06815 0.22 1 0.6424 
newUnempR -0.05109 0.19 1 0.6622 
newCPI1 -0.09154 0.61 1 0.4356 
newcSharep 0.05064 0.12 1 0.7273 
newMQMg 0.01251 0.01 1 0.9184 
newRDMCRg -0.03257 0.05 1 0.8231 
newOPs -0.06036 0.15 1 0.7002 
newCAGDP 0.1138 0.16 1 0.6937 
newCPGDP -0.06437 0.31 1 0.5798 
newFAGDP -0.02114 0.01 1 0.9292 
newBDGDP -0.07772 0.28 1 0.5988 
newcompeti~n -0.04177 0.12 1 0.7332 
newfinance -0.03494 0.09 1 0.7677 
newtmacsim~g 0.02876 0.05 1 0.8195 
global test  7.56 19 0.9906 
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6. Test of proportional-hazard assumption for Model 2 (quarterly-type) 
Time: Rank(t)         
  rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
0b.lfinop . . 1 . 
1.lfinop -0.04808 0.2 1 0.6551 
UnempgStdt~e -0.19967 2.6 1 0.1066 
tgdpg 0.04942 0.39 1 0.5331 
econsize -0.08683 0.53 1 0.4649 
newdGDPg -0.06373 0.57 1 0.45 
newdreer 0.16446 2.46 1 0.1165 
newdUnempR 0.0168 0.05 1 0.83 
newCPI1 -0.02341 0.18 1 0.6753 
newdcShareP 0.00635 0 1 0.9617 
newdMQMg 0.0767 0.41 1 0.5228 
newdRDMCRg -0.09718 0.87 1 0.3522 
newdOPsg -0.02585 0.07 1 0.788 
newCAGDPg -0.11329 2.42 1 0.1196 
newCPGDPg -0.13149 0.51 1 0.474 
newFAGDPg -0.06994 0.76 1 0.3821 
newBDGDPg 0.09508 0.39 1 0.5336 
newcompeti~n -0.16364 4.04 1 0.0443 
newfinance -0.10802 2.74 1 0.0977 
newtmacsim~g 0.15968 3.31 1 0.0687 
global test  19.8 19 0.4067 
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7. Test of proportional-hazard assumption for Model 3 (quarterly-type) 
Time: Rank(t)         
  rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
0b.lfinop . . 1 . 
1.lfinop -0.08482 0.34 1 0.5577 
UnempgStdt~e -0.18905 1.8 1 0.18 
PCris -0.02733 0.04 1 0.8323 
econsize 0.02727 0.03 1 0.8574 
newlGDPg 0.12993 0.95 1 0.3286 
newlreer 0.03209 0.05 1 0.8153 
newlUnempR -0.0192 0.02 1 0.8988 
newlCPI1 0.10181 0.45 1 0.5028 
newlcShareP -0.03724 0.07 1 0.7874 
newlMQMg 0.01769 0.02 1 0.8998 
newlRDMCRg -0.00493 0 1 0.9762 
newlOPs 0.00214 0 1 0.9892 
newlCAGDP 0.09937 0.25 1 0.6157 
newlCPGDP 0.13228 0.53 1 0.4648 
newlFAGDP -0.03229 0.07 1 0.7984 
newlBDGDP 0.03348 0.04 1 0.8438 
newcompeti~n -0.05931 0.16 1 0.6924 
newfinance -0.02355 0.03 1 0.8743 
newtmacsim~g 0.1006 0.4 1 0.5257 
global test  9.75 19 0.9589 
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8. Test of proportional-hazard assumption for Model 4 (quarterly-type) 
Time: Rank(t)         
  rho chi2 df Prob>chi2 
0b.lfinop . . 1 . 
1.lfinop 0.00828 0 1 0.9495 
UnempgStdt~e -0.12568 0.61 1 0.4346 
tgdpg 0.07189 0.53 1 0.4685 
PCris 0.04561 0.15 1 0.701 
econsize 0.13618 1.22 1 0.2697 
newldGDPg 0.16044 2.56 1 0.1094 
newldreer -0.05449 0.37 1 0.5438 
newldUnempR -0.09925 1.25 1 0.2638 
newldCPI1 0.13574 0.96 1 0.3282 
newldcShareP -0.12434 1.46 1 0.2269 
newldMQMg 0.08314 0.3 1 0.5853 
newldRDMCRg 0.01289 0.02 1 0.8927 
newldOPs -0.06854 0.65 1 0.421 
newldCAGDP -0.01401 0.02 1 0.8824 
newldCPGDP -0.02698 0.12 1 0.7275 
newFAGDP -0.01647 0.05 1 0.8299 
newldBDGDP 0.16969 1.3 1 0.2537 
newcompeti~n 0.08466 0.58 1 0.446 
newfinance -0.04696 0.24 1 0.6236 
newtmacsim~1 -0.07016 0.34 1 0.5582 
global test  15.57 20 0.743 
 
